Dan: You know that they sold over 1 million Chevrolet Impalas in 1965?
Stan: Who cares?
Dan: Well, it set a record for sales of a single model in one country that still stands today.
Stan: OK, that's vaguely interesting. I wonder what someone from 1965 would say if you told them that Toyota would one day outsell GM.
Dan: Impala-ssible!
Tuesday, September 18, 2012
Saturday, September 15, 2012
Why I feel that time travel is necessarily impossible
When considering time travel, I feel it is necessary to
weigh in with as logically complete an argument as I can muster. I do not know
about the progress that may have been done with subatomic or massless
particles. I do not claim that time travel of these objects may be found to be achievable
by human technology. I do claim that these events are necessarily infinitesimal: if there is found to be a
wall of progress, beyond which certain diminutive particles become too massive
to transport, or beyond which the duration of the time displacement becomes too
great to affect, then my points below will be just as valid.
1) What limitations do I propose of the term massive?
The limitations
of “massive” are not hard and fast. If it is technically possible to transport
1 g of mass, then it will likely become possible to transport 100 kg, or 1000
kg or more. But this development is not necessary for my point to remain valid.
If it is not possible to transport 100 kg, 1 g is enough mass for a suitably
advanced microcomputer to influence past events. Even if 1 g is not possible, 1
mg of VX nerve gas could be sent back in time to the exact spot in which Hitler
was standing in 1923, and kill him. As we drift downwards to other small quantities,
there approaches a point in which the displaced object is too small to make any
perceivable difference; that is what I would refer to as the cutoff point of “massive.”
Something that is the mass of an electron naturally has nonzero mass but I
would not refer to it as “massive.”
2) Is there just one timeline?
If
there are multiple universes, and each event divides the present universe into
parallel universes, this is in accordance with the “multiverse” theory. This
means that a “timeline” doesn’t really exist; at best, going back in time would
be to travel backwards from the present universe (the “leaf” of an infinite and
constantly expanding binary tree of universes) along any of an infinitely long
path of parent universes. If this theory is accurate, then time travel to the
past is not logically impossible. Even if one were to go back in time and kill
him or herself as an infant, the ramifications to the “present day” would be
felt in a parallel “present day” universe in which the traveler did not exist.
Since he must have lived in a divergent timeline in order to become an adult,
no paradox exists.
The
multiverse theory cannot be disproved at this point in time, but I do not feel
that it is a valid model. It is fairly
magical and whimsical. If all events led to another set of universes based on
the possible outcomes, then there would be an infinite number of universes. The
observable universe that we know at the present moment is finite, and so it is
possible that universes could communicate with each other. My argument here is
not an appeal to ridicule, since the notion of communicating with other
universes is strange but not inherently impossible, but that if communication
could possibly exist, the infinite sophistication of technology that would come
about through time travel would render it inevitable that in the present
universe in which we currently exist, evidence of this communication would be
manifest. Since such evidence is not manifest, I am inclined to disagree with
the multiverse theory.
3) What constitutes physical or logical impossibility?
Something
can only be definitively stated to be impossible if it causes logical error.
This is to say, if it defies logic for
such a condition to exist. 2+2 = 5 is impossible. Using mathematical rigor that is beyond my ability to competently provide, it can be proven that 2+2 = 4. For something
to be impossible, it must result in a paradox. Paradoxes are by their very
definition impossible and unachievable. The Novikov self-consistency principle
essentially states the same. It is basically a tautology, and of course like
all things scientific it can be denied, but if you contend that paradoxes ARE
possible, then you defy all existing human logic and you will have a very hard
time creating a new one to suit your beliefs.
4) What is the grandfather paradox?
This is
a very common theoretical paradox. An individual travels back in time and kills
his own grandfather, thus making his own existence impossible. This constitutes
a paradox in a one-timeline universe because he was never alive to kill his
grandfather, but this event definitely happened in the past. There are lots of paradoxes, but I will use this one.
Having qualified these terms, I have a few premises (bulleted) that I
want the reader to accept.
- If time travel caused paradoxes to exist, then time travel must necessarily be impossible, since paradoxes are by definition impossible.
This should not be controversial. If you are a multiverse
fan or you have some sort of alternate theory, then you are probably shaking
your head since nothing near and dear to you is under assault yet. But let me
go onward.
- A one-timeline universe in which time travel to past periods with macroscopic objects for non-negligible periods of time is possible, results in intentional attempts to create paradox.
This is a direct assault. I think it is crucial that this
premise is accepted and I will go to all lengths to ensure that it is. I’ll start with an example in the form of one of my favorite
middle-school novels, the very brilliant Timeline by Michael Crichton,
published 1999. Robert Doniger, the ruthless founder of a technology company
that invents time travel, gives us a monologue on why the grandfather paradox
is invalid. He says that the traveler might have the most tenacious will to
commit the act but the mere fact that history and his own memory records
differently means that the act must not have happened. Something must have
stopped the traveler and preserved the timeline. It could be as minor as
getting second thoughts, or it could be as extreme as the grandfather shooting
first and killing the traveler. Whatever the means, paradoxes do not occur.
Doniger’s explanation is not very convincing because it
comes from the perspective of a writer of science fiction. The writer of
science fiction often depicts the origins of time travel, gives us a good story
to read, and never has to contemplate what would happen if, instead of one time
travel journey, there were an infinite number of time travel journeys.
Maybe the perpetrator of grandfather paradox simply fails en route almost
all the time. Maybe even the best-laid plans of geniuses to create paradoxes
are somehow foiled. Maybe there are 1 million time travel events over 1000
years, trying to cause paradoxes, and somehow each one of them was defeated
before it changed the timeline in any impossible way.
But we are talking about an INFINITE number of time travel
events, which makes 1 million the same as zero. If there is any possibility of
causing a paradox, if somehow even the most foolproof method of just going back
in time to change history is always foiled, we should examine the preponderance
of probability, as I refer to it. What is more probable? 1) Time travel is
possible and an infinite number of time travel events somehow do not lead to a
single activity that causes a time paradox; 2) Time travel is not possible,
making it unnecessary to prevent every conscious effort to create a paradox.
I’m going to keep hammering on about infinity. Of course a
time paradox isn’t “supposed to happen”, but how much probability can stack
against it? If a time traveler came to the past with a million bombs, each of
which is 99% likely to work, and every single one is a dud, is that more
unlikely than time travel being impossible? But that’s not even fanciful. Let’s
propose some other things that very definitely would happen in an infinite
number of time travel events.
1.
A scientist and his colleague sit together in a
sealed room for 10 minutes motionless. They have a time machine which can take
one of them back exactly 5 minutes and can only be engaged from a remote
console; the time travel machine will self-destruct in 15 minutes. At the 10
minute mark, one of the scientists goes back in time 5 minutes with a katana
and decapitates the other scientist (sitting motionless), making the journey
impossible.
2.
A pregnant woman who knows that her child will
be born with a defect from the father goes back in time 6 months and persuades
her earlier self not to have sex with that particular man.
3.
A very dedicated Japanese Imperial sympathizer
goes back in time to 1945 and just minutes before the Trinity blast in Alamogordo,
he arrives and sabotages the device on the spot. The test is declared a failure
and Fat Man is not dropped on Nagasaki, which means that WWII does not end in
August 1945, in contravention to known history.
4.
A Nazi sympathizer goes back in time and
demonstrates his technology to the Germans. They bring their armies of 1942 and
1943 back to 1941, more than tripling the size and power of the force for
Operation Barbarossa. The Soviet Union capitulates in 1941. Thereafter, the
Germans conquer the world, in contravention to known history. They ostensibly preserve the "new" timeline by remembering to send exactly the same armies back in 1942 and 1943.
5.
The original inventor of time travel is
identified by a hater of time travel, who goes back in time and kills the
inventor.
All of these and millions more paradox attempts are
guaranteed because time travel will perpetuate itself. Once time travel is
invented, it will be used to go back in time, and then exist at a previous time
period. Eventually the time travel events will encompass every moment. The
leads me to the next main premise of my argument.
- Time travel’s existence will lead to an infinite number of time travel events, and an infinite number of attempts to create paradox.
As a prelude, let me address why each and every single time
travel event can’t be managed so as to not cause paradoxes. I need a new
example: Time Squad, a Cartoon Network show from the early 2000s.
This cartoon is actually pretty entertaining because it
shows revered historical figures to be totally different from the way posterity
records them. It shows Abraham Lincoln as a hooligan who has to be “reformed”
by the Time Squad. If we suspend our disbelief concerning the fact that
Lincoln’s second life was kept secret from the press of the
1860s, then their activities make total sense. We know that Abe Lincoln was
president 1861-1865, and that he fought and won the Civil War, and that he
signed the Emancipation Proclamation. Time Squad did not alter the past to
change history. They went back into time to ensure that history was preserved
in its current form. This causes no paradoxes, and it’s completely logical in a
one-timeline universe. Of course they went back in time! Because somebody had
to have gone back in time to help these historical figures- it obviously
happened in the past, even if nobody knew about it. This is totally plausible
even in the one-timeline model.
The problem is that Time Squad is made up of responsible persons who have not intervened in ways that are contrary to recorded history. They have not done anything that flagrantly violates what we acknowledge as fact. But they are one team working in a very regimented way with a very limited number of time travel events. If time travel were a real human technology, the infinite amount of time would tend to make it widespread.
I propose the following set of assertions that support my contention that an infinite number of time travel events follows from the mere invention of time travel.
The problem is that Time Squad is made up of responsible persons who have not intervened in ways that are contrary to recorded history. They have not done anything that flagrantly violates what we acknowledge as fact. But they are one team working in a very regimented way with a very limited number of time travel events. If time travel were a real human technology, the infinite amount of time would tend to make it widespread.
I propose the following set of assertions that support my contention that an infinite number of time travel events follows from the mere invention of time travel.
1.
Human beings may endure catastrophes that set
them back hundreds or thousands of years in technology, but on an overall
trend, they must inevitably get higher in technology.
2.
If a technology exists once, there must exist a
means, however complicated and expensive, to replicate it. Nobody has yet made
a device so miraculous that its purpose cannot be met by a reverse-engineered
device. We are not talking about what is “practical” to replicate. The pyramids
could not be practically made again unless hundreds of billions of dollars were
spent, and the workforce simply wouldn’t stand for it, but it is theoretically
possible.
3.
Technology tends to become more widespread over
time, inexorably and despite the best efforts and intentions of government and
organizations and communities. We are at a point in the 21st century
where nuclear weapons could potentially be developed by most of the world’s
countries. Almost all of them may choose not to do so, but as far as time
travel is concerned, it would only take one exception to cause a time paradox.
If North Korea developed time travel technology, it would spell the end.
4.
Free will does exist, and there are people who
do want to see the world destroyed. Even if it takes millennia to happen upon
such an evil person who would use time travel to contradict history, the
passage of time will generate so many time travel events that the presence of
nefarious intentions is assured in the long run.
5.
There is no human extinction event that will
wipe out people before time travel technology can spread. This may be the
hardest for some people to swallow. But if you consider that humans would have
a desire to prevent the extinction of their species, if most of the world were
rendered uninhabitable for a long time, one would reasonably predict that the
nation or entity that controlled time travel would save itself from the
extinction event by going into the past before the event. If you believe that
extinction will come before time travel is even discovered, then you’re dodging
the question of whether it’s possible or not. We have to assume that time
travel WOULD be discovered before extinction, or else there is no point in
discussing it.
6.
Going onward from Premise 5, if a nation or
group of people would choose to avoid an extinction event by going backwards
into the past or forwards into the future, then the timeline becomes basically
circular. At any point on the timeline there are an infinite number of people
who have chosen to avoid death by going into the past, because these people who
went into the past inflated the population of previous populations, who later
grew into the future population that also went back into the past to live there
as well. Perhaps this doesn’t cause any visible paradoxes on its own; maybe overcrowding is prevented by colonizing
other planets. Perhaps censuses are no longer taken. Maybe the
extinction-avoiders implement a government that kills off most of their
population and rigidly limits the number who can be saved, so as to avoid
interfering with the past timeline. However, the presence of this circularity
does still make the number of time travel events virtually infinite, and see
Premise 4 for a treatment of the ramifications of that condition.
The hardest part of my argument is yet to be made. We are at
the point now, I hope, where you agree that time travel will create a “circular”
timeline, if only one timeline exists.
D.
An infinite number of time travel events means
that in the long run, a paradox is guaranteed to occur.
I know, you’re thinking “How can he say that?” If paradoxes
are impossible, of course there must be some way to make sure that they do not
happen. I propose that the actual method of not creating paradoxes is by time travel
not existing in the first place, since if it did exist, there would be a
million trillion billion quadrillion people at every second in the entire
universe trying to go back in time and screw up the timeline. Whether they used
reliable tools and obedience of solid mechanical rules, or half-hearted and
poorly planned attempts, every action has to be counteracted by increasingly
improbable counteractions. The timeline could only be preserved if there was an
equally infinite number of “time preservers”, like the Time Squad, preemptively
preventing paradoxes. However, their job too would become impossible, since the
presence of infinite numbers of future travelers in the past would make the
witness of such events unavoidable. Right now, if time travel existed, somebody
from the year 2145 would unquestionably be trying to blow up a bomb in your
neighborhood, and even if it took a million tries for such a person to
successfully get to the year 2012 with a bomb, and even if it was defused at
the last second, you would still bear witness with your own eyes to time
travelers. A billion time travelers might somehow keep a secret, but an
infinite number of time travelers would with certainty have success in making
time travel known to previous generations.
I have met with some resistance on the topic of assuming
time travel would be developed before extinction, if time travel were possible.
Let us assume that extinction occurs; the argument becomes easy:
Premise: Time
travel is not discovered before extinction of intelligent life.
Premise:
Extinction causes the end of future technological developments.
Premise: Without
future technological developments, nothing new can be discovered.
Premise: If
time travel is never discovered, it remains impossible.
Conclusion: Time
travel remains impossible.
If you have
no further objections (please add them in the comments), then I’d like to
condense my argument to conclude.
Premise: Time
travel is discovered before extinction of intelligent life.
Premise: If time travel caused paradoxes to exist, then it must
necessarily be impossible, since paradoxes are impossible.
Premise: A one-timeline universe in which time travel to past periods
with macroscopic objects for non-negligible periods of time is possible,
results in intentional attempts to create paradox.
Premise: Time travel’s existence will lead to an infinite number of
time travel events.
Premise: An infinite number of time travel events means that in the
long run, a paradox is guaranteed to occur.
Conclusion 1: Time travel in one timeline will generate paradox.
Conclusion 2:
Time travel within one timeline is impossible.
Hope I’ve made you think. For a more entertaining story, let’s
change gears to a most patently incorrect treatment of time travel, along with
my most hated phrase: “ripple effect.” Of course I am talking about Back to the
Future.
The most agonizing part for me about Back to the Future and
the other two sequels is the notion that although there is one timeline, the
past can be changed to affect it, even as a future observer traveling into the
past.
Where does the Doc make it clear that there is one timeline?
When he suggests that a paradox could arise. If there were more than one
timeline, then paradoxes couldn’t occur. If Marty actually failed to get his
mother to fall in love with his dad in 1955, then there would exist an
alternate 1985 in which Marty McFly never existed, but that is obviously not
the 1985 from which he came and of which he had memory. There would be no
paradox here, just diverging timelines. If Marty stayed in 1955 for 30 years,
he would witness an alternate 1985 that was distinct from his own memory,
because the point of divergence occurred when he traveled back to 1955 and
started a new timeline.
If there is only one timeline, then nothing like the “ripple
effect” can occur. Marty being born around 1967 is an established fact. He
knows when he was born. There does not exist any doubt about the fact that he
was born, because he is a living, breathing teenager. If Marty could go back in
time to make himself not exist, then he couldn’t have existed to go back in
time to do it, because there is one timeline. A paradox is by definition impossible,
so it’s imaginary to even consider what a paradox might be like. Let’s say that
Marty failed spectacularly in getting his mom and dad to hook up in 1955. Let’s
say that he actually just abandoned Lorraine without success and returned to
1985. He didn’t de-materialize. The timeline would have to remain intact. It
would come out later that Marty’s parents were lying about kissing for the
first time at the Enchantment under the Sea dance, and they got together later.
Marty’s world could not be changed when he returned to 1985. George would still
have to be bullied by Biff, because that is what happened in the one timeline.
If Marty’s old 1985 showed his dad as a weak wimp, then unless he was in The
Matrix or being fed some kind of virtual reality simulation, that was the only
real 1985, and when he gets back his dad must still be the same weak wimp.
This
happily precludes paradoxes. But it means that the ripple effect is garbage. If
they were going back in time to prevent Biff from becoming rich, then their
deeds done in 1955 predated Biff becoming rich in 1958-1985, and so it could
never have happened in the first place. In our single timeline, they would have
arrived in 1955 and burned the sports almanac three years before Biff ever won
his first horse race, and so Biff would never have won all that money, and he
never would have taken over Hill Valley, and Biff’s matchbook would either have
to say that he was a casino owner or a car detailer, but it couldn’t possibly
be blurred from one to the other based on meddling with the past. The past predates
the present; the past has already happened relative to the present. The ripple
effect is itself a paradox, because it allows the time traveler to change
events in the past that would have affected the motivation to do the travel in
the future, even when removing the problem.
The
problem is not that paradoxes are possible, but that BTTF’s creators have taken
liberties with the possible effects of time travel. Everything that is done by
a time traveler in the past must have already influenced the future. It would
create no paradoxes whatsoever if a man was his own grandfather. Perhaps he knew that
his grandmother was a single parent but did not know who her lover was, and
when he went back in time he had sex with her as a young woman, causing the
creation of his family in the first place. His memory is intact, everything
happened in a way consistent with the one timeline. Consequently, the very fact
that Biff is rich in 1985 must be part of the timeline, and if they tried to go
back to 1955 to stop it, they could not stop it from happening. Something would
have to have intervened to stop it. The proof is in 1985. How could Biff be
rich if he never got the almanac 30 ears ago? Moviegoers don’t really ponder
the fact that the decision to stop Biff becoming rich came 30 years after it
had to have happened or not, and consequently that bit of history was already
written.
The Antebellum United States, Part I (1798-1824)
I have chosen to skip the period 1783-1798 in American history. It is an ambitious and difficult period to encapsulate in writing. However, by 1798, the basis of America's political legitimacy was assured, with many customs already set in place by first president George Washington.
By consensus of historians, the most influential event in American history was the US Civil War, fought from April 1861 to May 1865. This is well-known worldwide. However, even to astute Americans, it seems difficult to understand the prewar politics and balance of power that led to this war. There are so many causes and so many stories of everyone involved. It is astonishing to think that there were legendary statesmen like Henry Clay and Daniel Webster and John C. Calhoun who all represented a portion of American political culture, who earnestly sought the most prudent diplomatic measures to avoid war as late as 1850, though barely over 10 years later war itself would spontaneously occur. Democratic procedures elected Lincoln as president, leading to arguably democratic measures throughout the South to elect new, secessionist governments in opposition to this result. With the people of the North standing by Lincoln, and the people of the South standing against him, it would seem that it was a popular war, in that the political circumstances to create it were driven by the people and not by backroom intrigue or cynical presidential ambitions. Unfortunately, it was a long, bloody, filthy, miserable, hateful war. In all of America's history we have never paid such a huge price in our nation's sons for any other cause.
Many of the political realities leading up to the Civil War were set in place by 1824. The Missouri Compromise, discussed later, was a crucial milestone. To make sense of the antebellum period, one must first venture to describe the War of 1812 and its causes.
_________________________________________________________________________________
The personalities of the antebellum era are noted for little else other than their political cunning in maintenance of peace, both from external and internal events. However, as we shall see, they were enormously fortunate in that the foreign policy of Great Britain had evolved to the point in which there was little or no conflict of US-UK interests after the final defeat of Napoleon in 1815.
The fact that the then-infant United States did not break up and perish amid the Napoleonic Wars, is due directly to an increasing importance of Britain's other overseas colonies and the development of a powerful empire outside of North America. Perhaps if the Seven Years War had ended differently, with the British unable to annex India and push the French from this sphere of influence, then the British would have fought more tenaciously for the maintenance of their North American empire. One thing is clear- if, somehow, the British had been able to apply anything like the kind of strength in America that they had demonstrated against Napoleon, then the much-weaker Americans would have been utterly defeated and the states would have split up, perhaps with some of them annexed by the British Empire. In many ways, despite a few decades of independence and prodigious growth, America was weaker vis-a-vis the United Kingdom than it had been in 1775, when neither side yet enjoyed the fruit of the Industrial Revolution.
The American foreign policy was of short-tempered neutrality in the period 1798-1812. After the French Revolution and the fall of a government friendly to American interests, the Americans felt that their alliance to France was no longer valid, and they repudiated it. Federalist President John Adams was anti-war with either European power, though the Federalist Party in general was sympathetic to Great Britain, and antagonistic towards France. By comparison, the Democratic Republican Party sympathized with the French republican government and so the war was a public image problem for them. The war was not a decisive success for either side, and the French decided to call off their privateers and naval attacks. It was considered a nominal victory for the United States, although the French had been more successful at hunting American merchant shipping than anyone had expected.
France's behavior towards the US government was provocative, with French officials demanding a large bribe in the XYZ Affair, followed by French attacks on American merchant shipping. The "Quasi-War" was subsequently fought between the US and France in 1798-1800. Historical accounts differ on the success of the war for the United States. Many merchant ships were lost, but the US Navy acquitted itself well, and gained valuable experience.
In the two nations of Great Britain and France could be found manifestations of the political alignments that were developing in America. Of course the government was fully independent, but it was too weak and immature to create entirely new traditions. When crafting an American society, Federalists hoped to emulate the stability, strength, and commonly-held social customs of the English (notwithstanding the war of revolution against that country), and obviously the Democratic-Republicans saw this as obsequious at best, and disloyal at worst.
On the other hand, any notion Jefferson and his cadre had nurtured of supporting the French Revolution became farfetched after the news of the mass executions became known, and the Quasi-War ended the dream permanently. Clearly, the United States would not ally itself with France.
Democratic Republicans took the presidency with Thomas Jefferson in 1800, and from that election onward they controlled the Congress solidly. Although the French cause had fallen out of favor in the American mainstream, President Jefferson was still virulently anti-British. Federalists squawked helplessly when Jefferson declared an embargo against trade with Europe, and when his successor James Madison laid the following claims about British behavior in front of the American people:
Although the US was considerably stronger in 1812 than it was in 1775, it was probably weaker relative to Great Britain, which had grown much more rapidly. America's chances of achieving all its war aims were at least as fanciful as the Confederacy achieving lasting independence, or of American force of arms securing the freedom of South Vietnam and getting a lasting peace. The USA in 1812 suffered from enormous disadvantages compared to Britain.
Historians have often pointed to the overall results of the War of 1812 to support a thesis that the Americans lost the war in general and only succeeded in their limited political objectives because of the presence of Napoleon occupying the lion's share of British activity. However, this common thesis is wrong for a few reasons.
What followed the Battle of New Orleans was probably the first case of absolute national ecstasy. It must have been comparable to V-J Day or the announcement of the effectiveness of the Salk polio vaccine on April 12, 1955. Ursuline nuns in New Orleans prayed before the battle for deliverance, and the prioress Mother Ste. Marie Olivier de Vezin made a solemn vow to offer an annual mass of Thanksgiving on that very day, for every year going forward, if the battle should be won (it was still being upheld by the nuns as of 2012).
In New England, the Hartford Convention formulated the following demands of the Federalist Party and its supporters, to be implemented by Constitutional amendments.
Even if the news from New Orleans was disastrous, it's fanciful to think that the Federalists would have garnered some sympathy for their proposals. Even in peacetime, each proposal would be a hard fight through Congress, and then would have to be submitted to the states for ratification, which was utterly impossible to meet with success.
What are the probable results of a national candidate or national party gaining the reputation of being anti-war at a dangerous crossroads in history?
The Era of Good Feelings was still present in 1823, by which time almost every French, Spanish and Portuguese colony in South and Central America successfully declared independence and formed republics. They were able to do so with little bloodshed because all European nations were busy with the Napoleonic Wars in Europe.
The new states were all recognized by the USA, which welcomed the presence of an entire hemisphere dedicated to democracy. The Americans feared the return of former colonial overlords to reclaim the now-independent states of the Western Hemisphere. Another difficult question was on the Pacific Coast of North America, where Russia was expanding its claims and America was eager to rein in their ambitions. However, any kind of pledge by the United States to protect the sovereignty of the Americas was not backed by sufficient force.
There was now another option, unthinkable just ten years earlier: cooperation with the British. Following the successful conclusion of the War of 1812, the long-term repercussion of the now-thawed state of British-American relations was cooperation on the high seas. The British had not lost any territory in North America in the last war, and never had any in South America to begin with. They also considered it desirable to prevent the Spanish, French, and Portuguese from reconquering the profitable land in the Western Hemisphere, because that would have the consequence of disallowing British merchants to trade freely with those lands. Free trade benefited the British most of all nations, because of their massive merchant fleet.
The history books rarely make mention of the fact that the "Monroe Doctrine" was basically a British idea that was passed over to the Americans who convinced themselves that it was their own idea. The British Foreign Minister George Canning proposed to President Monroe that a joint declaration of the independence and territorial integrity of the New World be made by the United States and Great Britain. Canning must have known that Monroe couldn't possibly accept such terms so shortly after a war between the countries, particularly because this statement would have humiliated the United States by emphasizing its weakness.
On one side, an outright alliance with the British would have been silly and one-sided; a naval alliance was derided by Secretary of State Adams as "[...] undignified, like a tiny American cockboat sailing in the wake of a British man-of-war." Thus it was critical that the American people understood the plan to be purely American, and not implying anything about the power of the USA to enforce security of the Western Hemisphere. If any specific statements were made about America's commitment to defend other republics, it would have exposed the Americans as spineless and weak during a period that they lacked the strength to keep any European nation (even Russia or Portugal) out of the Americas.
On the other side, whatever statement the Americans made on behalf of the new nations of South America would be beneficial to its relations with those countries, and would let America save face in the eyes of the world, even if it didn't have plausible power to back it up. Americans must have also realized that if they made such a guarantee unilaterally, that it would meet with tacit British approval, and there would be irregular cooperation to enforce it between the navies, so the practical effect would be similar.
The end result was the Monroe Doctrine, actually devised by Adams, which was a very stuffy and boring legal-ese document. Simplified, it basically asserts that any attempts by colonial powers to conquer new lands or to challenge the territory or independence of existing republics, within the entire Western Hemisphere, would be opposed by the United States. Management and control of existing colonies was allowed (such as Canada). The Monroe Doctrine did not make any mention of Great Britain and it surely did not hint of alliance. It also gave no concrete commitments by the United States, and acted merely as an idealized theory for a then-unenforceable policy.
However, the British actually acted most strongly in defense of the Monroe Doctrine, so its practical effect was just the same as a bilateral agreement between the UK and US. The independence of the South American states was overwhelmingly protected by the Royal Navy, not by the fledgling US Navy.
Ironically, the vagueness of the Monroe Doctrine has allowed it to be used elastically throughout the ensuing years. In the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, Secretary of State Seward loudly threatened to send nearly 1 million war-tempered bayonets of the Union Army into Mexico to expel the French-appointed Emperor Maximilian; the French immediately disavowed their puppet and he was ingloriously executed by the Mexican people. By 1900, the USA was the world's strongest economic power, and although its military was relatively weak by European standards, it had the clout to add the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, emphasizing that any intervention in independent Latin American republics for the purpose of repaying debts would be opposed by the United States.
Still, however, none of these usurpations by the United States ever came at the expense of Great Britain, and the two nations became all the closer for it. The long-term effects of this cooperation are so ponderous that it is difficult to overstate them. If there had been no Monroe Doctrine, the interests of the US and UK may have diverged in a different direction, leading to war. It would never have been demonstrated how preferable it was to cooperate in the international scene. The fundamentally overlapping interests of these two nations was shown when both nations benefited by upholding the Monroe Doctrine. Without this crucial period, the United States may never have worked up enough sympathy to embroil itself in WWI on the British side, and perhaps naval war would have come in 1922 instead of the Washington Naval Conference.
Unquestionably, the long-term advantages of the Monroe Doctrine for the British were profound. The United States was weak in 1823, but it would be the world's most powerful nation just 80 years later. Cooperation with the Monroe Doctrine made Britain seem inherently more noble and trustworthy than other European monarchies, and not only made war between the two nations less probable, but also smoothed the transition of power. All previous world super-empires, such as Rome, Ming China, the Mongol Empire, and others had not faded gracefully, but disintegrated ingloriously. The British Empire did slowly fade away, but the United States financed the salvation of the homeland of the UK in two world wars and aided in its defense on a massive scale. To this day, the United Kingdom still enjoys cordial relations with most of its former colonies (including and especially the United States) and is still one of the world's most powerful and developed nations. Not too bad for them. I'd put the Monroe Doctrine at #1 on the list of the best British foreign policy decisions of all time. (We can only hope that the transition from the US to China, if it happens, is so mutualistic.)
By consensus of historians, the most influential event in American history was the US Civil War, fought from April 1861 to May 1865. This is well-known worldwide. However, even to astute Americans, it seems difficult to understand the prewar politics and balance of power that led to this war. There are so many causes and so many stories of everyone involved. It is astonishing to think that there were legendary statesmen like Henry Clay and Daniel Webster and John C. Calhoun who all represented a portion of American political culture, who earnestly sought the most prudent diplomatic measures to avoid war as late as 1850, though barely over 10 years later war itself would spontaneously occur. Democratic procedures elected Lincoln as president, leading to arguably democratic measures throughout the South to elect new, secessionist governments in opposition to this result. With the people of the North standing by Lincoln, and the people of the South standing against him, it would seem that it was a popular war, in that the political circumstances to create it were driven by the people and not by backroom intrigue or cynical presidential ambitions. Unfortunately, it was a long, bloody, filthy, miserable, hateful war. In all of America's history we have never paid such a huge price in our nation's sons for any other cause.
Many of the political realities leading up to the Civil War were set in place by 1824. The Missouri Compromise, discussed later, was a crucial milestone. To make sense of the antebellum period, one must first venture to describe the War of 1812 and its causes.
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The War of 1812- A win-win situation
The fact that the then-infant United States did not break up and perish amid the Napoleonic Wars, is due directly to an increasing importance of Britain's other overseas colonies and the development of a powerful empire outside of North America. Perhaps if the Seven Years War had ended differently, with the British unable to annex India and push the French from this sphere of influence, then the British would have fought more tenaciously for the maintenance of their North American empire. One thing is clear- if, somehow, the British had been able to apply anything like the kind of strength in America that they had demonstrated against Napoleon, then the much-weaker Americans would have been utterly defeated and the states would have split up, perhaps with some of them annexed by the British Empire. In many ways, despite a few decades of independence and prodigious growth, America was weaker vis-a-vis the United Kingdom than it had been in 1775, when neither side yet enjoyed the fruit of the Industrial Revolution.
War with France
The American foreign policy was of short-tempered neutrality in the period 1798-1812. After the French Revolution and the fall of a government friendly to American interests, the Americans felt that their alliance to France was no longer valid, and they repudiated it. Federalist President John Adams was anti-war with either European power, though the Federalist Party in general was sympathetic to Great Britain, and antagonistic towards France. By comparison, the Democratic Republican Party sympathized with the French republican government and so the war was a public image problem for them. The war was not a decisive success for either side, and the French decided to call off their privateers and naval attacks. It was considered a nominal victory for the United States, although the French had been more successful at hunting American merchant shipping than anyone had expected.
France's behavior towards the US government was provocative, with French officials demanding a large bribe in the XYZ Affair, followed by French attacks on American merchant shipping. The "Quasi-War" was subsequently fought between the US and France in 1798-1800. Historical accounts differ on the success of the war for the United States. Many merchant ships were lost, but the US Navy acquitted itself well, and gained valuable experience.
In the two nations of Great Britain and France could be found manifestations of the political alignments that were developing in America. Of course the government was fully independent, but it was too weak and immature to create entirely new traditions. When crafting an American society, Federalists hoped to emulate the stability, strength, and commonly-held social customs of the English (notwithstanding the war of revolution against that country), and obviously the Democratic-Republicans saw this as obsequious at best, and disloyal at worst.
On the other hand, any notion Jefferson and his cadre had nurtured of supporting the French Revolution became farfetched after the news of the mass executions became known, and the Quasi-War ended the dream permanently. Clearly, the United States would not ally itself with France.
War with Britain
Democratic Republicans took the presidency with Thomas Jefferson in 1800, and from that election onward they controlled the Congress solidly. Although the French cause had fallen out of favor in the American mainstream, President Jefferson was still virulently anti-British. Federalists squawked helplessly when Jefferson declared an embargo against trade with Europe, and when his successor James Madison laid the following claims about British behavior in front of the American people:
- Great Britain had impressed American seamen; this means they boarded American ships to kidnap sailors in violation of the sovereignty implied by the American flag flying above their vessels.
- Great Britain had issued "Orders in Council" which amounted to acts of war against any vessels that traded with Napoleon. The Americans howled ineffectually that this was a violation of international law and the principle of free trade.
- Great Britain did not recognize the right of the United States to naturalize foreign-born citizens. They believed that all seamen who were born British subjects were never free from their obligation to the Crown, and that these individuals could be permanently kidnapped and taken back to the UK. This kind of behavior infuriated the United States and amounted to a lack of recognition of the sovereignty of that nation.
- Great Britain had maintained a string of forts in the Midwest (then known as the Northwest Territory) on territory which had supposedly been ceded to the United States in the Treaty of Paris following the American Revolution. This was in violation of the territorial integrity of the United States.
- Furthermore, from these forts they had, in flagrant violation of that treaty, armed and empowered Indian tribes hostile to the United States, in order that they might attack American frontier settlements. The British dreamed of a powerful Indian buffer state, probably under leadership of Tecumseh, that would advance sufficiently to provide a counterbalance to American interests.
- Great Britain did not show any customary diplomatic courtesy to the United States, never apologizing for any of its disastrous interventions, like the Chesapeake-Leopard affair (where they fired on an American ship and killed or wounded 21 Americans).
Madison never called for a declaration of war explicitly, but his statements to Congress made it utterly obvious that he was pro-war.
Relative strengths
- The United States had no allies whatsoever, whereas in the Revolution it enjoyed the full assistance of France, and indirect assistance by the Netherlands and Spain, which fought against the British for their own benefit. The British counted upon a much greater degree of Indian cooperation in this war than in previous North American wars.
- The Industrial Revolution started decades earlier in Britain than in the United States. By 1812, the Royal Navy consisted of nearly one thousand ships, while US government-owned seagoing vessels (though well-constructed and brand-new) numbered 20 total, with no ships-of-the-line. British siege weapons and naval tactics were unquestionably the world's most advanced.
- The British Army and Royal Navy were battle-hardened from years of war with Napoleon, and the general quality of their men was higher due to this experience.
- As in the Revolution, the US had no preparations whatsoever for war. It had a standing army of perhaps 7,000 men. That many men could have been lost by the British in a single one-day battle with Napoleon.
- Canada, Great Britain's remaining colony in North America, was much more united and less disorganized than the Americans reckoned. Consequently, the US invasion of Canada, which Madison predicted would be "merely a matter of marching," was a costly failure.
- The general body of New Englanders, most Federalists, were opposed to the declaration of war. Although many of them stood behind their country patriotically, and most of the rest kept their mouths shut, some of them traded illegally with the British. The faction of "blue light Federalists" were rumored to shine blue lights from darkened harbors at night to alert British blockade ships about the presence of American blockade runners. This traitorous behavior has never been physically substantiated, and no US citizen was ever prosecuted for treason by collaboration with the British.
- Until nearly the end of the war, the Americans had no personality to inspire them as General Washington had in 1775-1783. President James Madison was timid and disappointingly short in stature; when he commanded troops personally in the field in front of Washington in 1814, he suffered disastrous defeat. American leadership was defined by the successful Western generals William Henry Harrison and Andrew Jackson, the latter coming into his own only in the last few weeks of the war.
- Britain had few pressing demands from North America and their war aims largely consisted of reining in American commerce with Continental Europe. Consequently, in order to "win" they did not have to meet ambitious goals, and if the Americans gave up, the British people would accept status quo antebellum.
- America's war aims were ambiguous. Were they fighting for honor, for conquest of Canada, or simply for the stated aims of ending impressment of their seamen and violations of their neutral right to trade? America's varying conception of victory was hopelessly high in 1812; they hoped to annex Canada and take control over all North America.
However, the Americans did enjoy some advantages in this new conflict.
- The conflict in Europe against France meant that only perhaps 10-20% of the fighting strength of the British Army and Navy were available for the American theater. The Americans fought a tiny portion of the actual strength of the British foe. Still, even with this diversion, the British fielded 45,000 troops by war's end, with 35,000 for the Americans, and British troops individually fought better, on the whole, than American troops.
- Because of the distraction of the European war, Britain was largely oblivious to the political situation in America. There is little evidence to suggest that New England was full of willing traitors, but some were advocating secession from the federal union, and if Britain had nurtured this rift with financial and military support, they might have been able to cripple the unity of the American people. As it happened, they fought a conventional war against the entire American people, and no such collaboration occurred.
- The British leadership was far from inspired. Field commanders of genius such as the Duke of Wellington were never dispatched to America. Americans could count on the fighting prowess of the King's troops, but the generally good British general staff did not serve it especially well in America.
- The American industry had advanced to a point where it could largely produce its own small arms and powder, whereas in the Revolutionary War, at least 70% of these goods were bought or donated by France. While the Americans would rarely be as well-equipped as their British adversaries, they at least had enough powder and shot to fight for as long as the war was likely to last.
- Americans were more likely to have rifles than their British adversaries, who still mostly carried smoothbore muskets. The American Kentucky rifle was also better than the British Baker rifle. American riflemen were more experienced at hunting, and consequently extremely good marksmen who occasionally managed to change the course of battle by sniping senior officers.
- America's military budget was paltry, but in the case of the navy, it was very prudently spent. The original six frigates were designed to be stronger and more powerful than any other frigates afloat, while they were fast enough to evade any ships of the line. In single-ship combat, the US navy often got the better of equally-rated British counterparts. USS Constitution took or sank five enemy warships and British shot would occasionally bounce off the over-engineered oak hull, giving this ship the nickname "Old Ironsides." Although the US Navy was never strong enough to defeat the British blockade, they punched substantially above their weight.
- The American merchant marine was also surprisingly strong. Its numbers nearly doubled between 1802 and 1810, even though a nationwide embargo was supposedly in place 1807-1808. the US merchant fleet was by far the strongest and most experienced of all the neutral nations in the Napoleonic Wars. This was to prove an advantage in providing an ample supply of privateers once war came. American privateers captured 209 vessels from the British in the first four months of war and they succeeded in taking perhaps 1,300 by war's end. The emergence of a strong American maritime presence was the only compelling reason that the British had for fearing the United States at the time, since the British wanted unilateral blue-sea dominance.
- British ambitions became much more brazen after the defeat of Napoleon in 1814. The people of the US, except for the most diehard secessionists, stood united against the British after they published their demands for a neutral Indian buffer state in the Midwest and large cessions of American territory. The Duke of Wellington did not refuse to be transferred to the American theater if called, but he bluntly stated to his superiors that "the state of your military operations, however creditable, does not entitle you to demand any [territorial concessions]."
The case for American victory
- The stated causes for British transgressions against the United States are mostly linked to the Napoleonic Wars. If not for Napoleon providing a credible threat to the UK, the UK would never have viewed the United States as an accessory threat. The actions taken by Great Britain would not have been entirely friendly to the United States, but in the absence of such provocations, there would never have been a war.
- General defeat was not akin to comprehensive defeat. At no point was America in danger of being comprehensively defeated; every major victory of the Americans was so spectacular and so widely celebrated that it would be enshrined forever in the nation's memory.
- America's unity only grew as the war went on. Once some victories were achieved, there were heroes and tales of glory to motivate the body of citizens. The Federalist Party never generally condoned treason to the national government, and it was only smear efforts by their Democratic-Republican opponents that gave rise to this claim. Still, by the time they published their grievances of the Hartford Convention, the war was already over. The news of the victory at New Orleans made Federalists seem like cowards and crybabies; it resonated catastrophically for future election campaigns, since they publicly came against a war that ended very popularly at the very same moment that the greatest victories came. If any event doomed the Federalists, it was their publicly-stated opposition to the War of 1812.
Regarding who was the "victor" of the war, US historians and authors in the subsequent period were willing victims of selective amnesia, ignoring the Burning of Washington, the failed invasion of Canada, the startling effectiveness of the British blockade, and the devastation that British armies and their Indian allies inflicted on American frontier communities. For every ten medium-sized skirmishes in which British regulars trounced
American militia, there was a battle in which the British were
frustrated by surprisingly effective American defenses and tactics. These are the
battles which are remembered.
- Battle of Lake Erie (1813): This was the most important naval battle on the Great Lakes, and ensured American control of the northern theater. Commander Oliver Hazard Perry led a makeshift American fleet of nine vessels to match a British makeshift fleet on Lake Erie. Though the American flagship Lawrence was captured, Perry escaped in a rowboat to brig Niagara, and in the confusion he outfought the British fleet until its surrender of the two ships, one brig, two schooners, and one sloop. The immortal quote "We have met the enemy and they are ours" comes from a message to General William Henry Harrison that Perry quickly penned after the battle.
- Battle of the Thames (1813): After a long series of setbacks, the Americans under General Harrison fought and defeated the British-Indian coalition under Procter and Tecumseh. The British suffered badly and lost 600 as prisoners, while the Americans suffered a few dozen casualties. The Indians were dispersed, and Tecumseh was killed, leading the Iroquois Confederation to disintegrate. Many cite Richard Mentor Johnson or Harrison himself as the executor of Tecumseh. Along with the less-decisive Battle of Tippecanoe in 1811 (which is lumped in with the War of 1812 because it was fought with the same Indians who would later join with the British after 1812), Thames cemented Harrison's reputation as a war hero and catapulted him to the presidency in 1840 when he decided to run on the Whig ticket.
- Battle of Baltimore (1814): At this point, the British had succeeded in sacking Washington, but the government had already fled. Furthermore, this force was not large enough to conquer swathes of American territory. It fell back and was evacuated; the main invasion force came at Baltimore. Here they encountered a surprisingly large American defensive force. The British land force was deprived of its excellent leader, General Robert Ross, leaving his mediocre subordinate, Colonel Arthur Brooke, to lead the attack. They made little progress and were not able to advance without artillery support from the Royal Navy. The British ships first had to enter Baltimore Harbor, which was blocked by scuttled merchant ships and protected by the modern, well-supplied Fort McHenry. Though the fort was mercilessly bombarded with fusilades and rockets for more than 25 hours, it was held. The British withdrew, and Francis Scott Key (aboard a British vessel attempting to secure the release of Dr. Beanes, a US civilian being held prisoner) recalled the dazzling visual display of the British bombardment, and the subsequent failure to take down the enormous American flag at the fort, with America's future national anthem: The Star-Spangled Banner.
- Battle of New Orleans: (1815): Of the two major invasion plans that Great Britain executed in 1814-1815, the first was in Baltimore, and the larger second effort was in the south. General Andrew Jackson commanded perhaps 4,000 troops against nearly 11,000 British regulars who had been redeployed from Europe. Perhaps they were overconfident, but then-commander, Gen. John Keane, was unimaginative and slow in approaching the city. Jackson ordered a harrassment raid on the British camp while they slept; though both sides took equal losses, the British became overly cautious and never regained the initiative. By the time of the main battle on Jan. 8, the British attacked in their full force but they met extremely stubborn resistance and earthwork defenses by Jackson's men, many of them equipped with deadly Kentucky rifles. The Americans made no retreats that day, and pounded the advancing British so hard that few of the redcoats even made it to the front lines; seasoned veterans of the Napoleonic Wars swore they had never seen such a volume of fire. The British suffered 2,042 casualties, including a high proportion of officers and three generals, compared to Jackson's 71 casualties, of which few were officers. The invasion had gotten off to a disastrous start, and the overall commander Gen. Lambert thought it too costly to continue even with reinforcements. The Royal Navy hastily evacuated the force and news spread back through America like wildfire. Whereas the press had been publishing doom stories for weeks as 1814 drew to a close, claiming that as many as 20,000 British troops were landing in New Orleans, the new year of 1815 was soon greeted with news of an almost unbelievably lopsided victory. The Battle of New Orleans was absolutely critical in that it fulfilled the American lust for glory and honor, eliminating one of the key reasons for the war.
Humorously, Canadian historians and authors engaged in the same kind of forgetfulness, believing the war to be an unqualified success for Canada by preserving its independence against invasion from the US. Canada's victories on its own soil were definitely a testament to their fighting capacity. However, golden memories ignore the lack of unity in Canada at the time, the poor performance of Canadian troops whenever not fighting in last-ditch defense, and the dearth of success that was achieved by Canadian armies whenever not bolstered by homeland British troops. Left to its own devices, and without British officers, the Canadian militia was a rabble, and unlikely to defeat even the comparatively weak American regular army.
From an American perspective, the war was a successful defense by a young country of their principles and territory against aggression from Britain, which was the most powerful nation in the world at the time. Even if New Orleans was repeated again ten times, it is unlikely the Americans could have gotten all of their demands. This would require convincingly defeating the entire British Army, which for the United States was impossible. But this was immaterial. The Treaty of Ghent was already in force before the battle began. What American people received was news of peace, coupled with the sweet taste of victory, and nevermind that they still got no protection from the very threats that originally propelled them into warfare.
Every side that fought the War of 1812 won... except the Indians.
With Napoleon gone, and the British Empire stronger than ever, the British people had nothing to gain from continuing the war against America. Canada would be the only winner, perhaps annexing territory at the expense of the United States. Why would British soldiers risk their lives for more colonial possessions in North America, where political boundaries were mature and clearly defined, as opposed to Asia and Africa, with richer pickings and more pliable natives for little or no bloodshed?
- Why the British won: The British saved face at the very end of the war, in spite of the defeat at New Orleans, by making peace without losing any territory in Canada. They were not required to apologize or reimburse for the impressment and neutrality violations committed prior to war. They could quite rightly feel that their armies had done fairly well, winning most of the battles and managing to get a peace which did not require them to give anything up. The succeeded in burning Washington.
- Why the Canadians won: Canada's independence was preserved, and a growing sense of Canadian nationalism emerged. The French Catholics had fought alongside English-blooded Protestants in defense of a Canadian state that would respect religious freedom, because they feared that America would force Catholics to convert(a baseless assertion). Once and for all, America dropped any claims to Canadian territory.
- Why the Americans won: Every practical portion of its casus belli was moot by 1814, since Napoleonic France was defeated and the British were no longer desperately raiding the seas to persecute neutral shipping. They succeeded in burning York, a provincial capital in Canada. They won some well-regarded successes in the face of overwhelming odds, and their lucky breaks at Baltimore and New Orleans would go down in history forever. National unity developed which would carry the nation through to the Civil War. Although the Battle of New Orleans had no effect on the Treaty of Ghent, its impact on the British people was to force them to abide by the terms of the treaty and accord America some respect.
- Why, moreover, all sides won: Both sides lost important capital cities. Both sides lost proportional amounts of men and treasure, while no side lost territory, leaving nothing left for revanchists to claim. America gave up all claims to Canada at the same time in which Britain finally treated America like a proper nation. The inherent equality of these circumstances compelled the British and Americans to focus on their commonalities in future times. Both were English-speaking nations with a majority of Protestants of Anglo-Saxon stock. Though Great Britain was still a monarchy, it was by far the most liberal in Europe, and closest to the interests of the United States. The seeds of Anglo-American alliance were sowed not in 1914, but in 1814, in the Treaty of Ghent.
- Why the Indians lost: Every single retreat that the British took in the western territory exposed the weak will of their European ally. The American people had steely determination to expand west, and because of the Indian attacks on American settlements, the government was eager to extract some vengeance. Throughout the war, the Indian cause ebbed lower and lower, until they gave up all dreams of holding onto the Midwest, and evacuated further west.
Never swap horses midstream
What followed the Battle of New Orleans was probably the first case of absolute national ecstasy. It must have been comparable to V-J Day or the announcement of the effectiveness of the Salk polio vaccine on April 12, 1955. Ursuline nuns in New Orleans prayed before the battle for deliverance, and the prioress Mother Ste. Marie Olivier de Vezin made a solemn vow to offer an annual mass of Thanksgiving on that very day, for every year going forward, if the battle should be won (it was still being upheld by the nuns as of 2012).
In New England, the Hartford Convention formulated the following demands of the Federalist Party and its supporters, to be implemented by Constitutional amendments.
- Outlawing of embargoes that would last more than 60 days.
- Requirement of a 3/5 majority for declaration of an "offensive war" (which they believed the War of 1812 was), for admission of a new state, or interdiction of foreign commerce.
- Removal of "three-fifths compromise" in the Constitution, which treated each slave as "3/5 of a person" so as to increase the representation of slaveholding states in the Congress, even though slaves could not vote and had no rights.
- One-term limitation on future U.S. Presidents.
- Each President elected must be from a different state than his predecessor.
Even if the news from New Orleans was disastrous, it's fanciful to think that the Federalists would have garnered some sympathy for their proposals. Even in peacetime, each proposal would be a hard fight through Congress, and then would have to be submitted to the states for ratification, which was utterly impossible to meet with success.
What are the probable results of a national candidate or national party gaining the reputation of being anti-war at a dangerous crossroads in history?
- 1816: After opposing the War of 1812 and with rumors of planned secession, the Federalist Party lost all mainstream support outside of New England. They found a surprisingly good candidate in Rufus King, but even if George Washington himself came back from the dead to run on the Federalist ticket they would still have lost. The Federalist Party collapsed between 1816-1820, and for a brief period the old party designations lost meaning, since everyone elected to the Congress was a Democratic-Republican.
- 1864: The Democrats ran on a platform that was mildly anti-war, but its candidate George B. McClellan was personally pro-war. He had some personal popularity, but basically opposed Lincoln on petty issues, and lost. Lincoln did not technically run on the Republican ticket in 1864; it was temporarily renamed the "Union Party" to appeal to Democrats that supported the war.
- 1900: The Democrats ran William Jennings Bryan, who had been extremely supportive of the Spanish-American War, but in the postwar aftermath had opposed the annexation of the Philippines and claimed that the Americans were engaging in imperialism. This was just enough rope for the Republicans to hang him, and McKinley won re-election convincingly on his war record, with the public acknowledging that there were still hostilities in the Philippines.
- 1940: For the first time in several elections, the economy was not the largest issue, although much campaigning was still done in support of, or opposition to, the New Deal. After the Republicans waffled about whether to adopt a pro-war or isolationist stance to WWII, they decided to attack Roosevelt for being unprepared for war. It backfired, since FDR preempted all realistic accusations by massive military buildup in 1940, running most strongly on his experience in foreign policy and his ability to keep the nation out of war or win it if they end up caught in it. FDR easily secured re-election. In 1944, the war was going so well for the United States that Dewey didn't stand a chance.
- 1968: In a very close, hard-fought election, Republican Richard Nixon (winner in 1960) won over Hubert Humphrey despite the dominance of the Democratic Party at the time. In 1964 LBJ had creamed Barry Goldwater and the Republicans looked like extremists; now in 1968 the Democratic National Convention seemed to be overrun by pacifist anti-government elements that tainted the entire party with defeatism. Although the Vietnam War was not going well, the public trusted Nixon's hardline anti-communism to end the war successfully.
- 1988: The Cold War is still a big campaign issue. With Reagan's military buildup of the 1980s directly contributing to the weakness of the Soviet Union in the last period of the decade, Bush the Elder ran on the same tough stance, and lampooned his opponent Michael Dukakis for weakness on military matters, especially for his comical photo-op appearance while driving an M1 Abrams tank.
- 2004: Although it is already clear that the Iraq War did not go as smoothly as planned, Bush the Younger is given a second term primarily because his opponent John Kerry ran on an anti-war platform. Bush's bipartisan popularity erodes anew in his second term, but he maintains approval of most Republicans until 2008. In the final year of his term, Bush's handling of the economic crisis is lampooned. Americans do not widely support his domestic policies, and by the end of his second term he will be extremely unpopular. As of 2012, Bush has been under the radar for several years and his reputation still has undergone very little, if any, improvement. He might be compared to Herbert Hoover in how reviled he was in his own time; the 2008 election featuring John McCain reminded some observers of the 1936 election in which FDR ran against not the Republican candidate directly, but against the ghost of Hoover's supposedly-failed policies.
The American people have historically been reluctant to cause war, but they take the prosecution of war very seriously. In American history, if the President starts to fight a war, the American people almost always give him two terms to do it. Never in American history has an anti-war party or candidate triumphed in the midst of a major war or shortly thereafter. Sometimes the danger is not actually real, as Humphrey would probably have done exactly what Nixon did, and Vietnam fell to communism anyway.
This phenomenon is usually given as an old-timey adage: Never swap horses midstream. The meaning of this is that the American people will always support a wartime president if they feel the war is actually truly dangerous to America's existence or freedom, in the interest merely of preserving unity and letting the war run to a consistent, victorious conclusion. This support especially applies if there is any whiff of the opposition party opposing or undermining the war effort. The Federalists were the first party to become associated with defeatism, although not really the last. The later Democrats would have to atone for their sordid behavior during the Civil War by losing almost every presidential election of the second half of the 19th century. When FDR mobilized traditional Democratic strengths (progressive policies and job creation schemes) while subsuming contemporary Republican strengths (industrial growth and success in war), he made the Democratic Party dominant for decades to follow. Even the personal unpopularity of George W. Bush and certain of his Cabinet couldn't unseat him in 2004 when the Democrat platform began to stink of defeatism.
The Era of Good Feelings
James Monroe was the last of the U.S. Presidents who was a Founding Father. He had fought in the Revolutionary War, and he was an anti-Federalist that opposed ratification of the Constitution for Virginia. This made him a good candidate to curry the outrage of the American people against any Federalist doctrines after the War of 1812. There was a minor row against Virginia, since 3 of the previous 4 presidents (Washington, Jefferson, and Madison) had come from Virginia, and Monroe was again a Virginian; some Americans feared a dynasty would emerge that would dominate the Presidency. However, no other candidate would have been as popular as Monroe, and he would indeed be the last President to ever hail from Virginia. The Hartford Convention's plan to prevent a single state from dominating the Presidency became superfluous after Monroe.
Monroe had the immense fortune to live in a time in which partisan politics were almost nonexistent. He had the luxury of appointing his preferred candidates from either party to whatever office he chose. The Federalist Party dissolved, and consequently the Democratic-Republican Party stopped convening its caucus, and also ceased to be organized at a national level. Politics both in New England and the rest of the nation dissolved into localized issues. In 1820, the Democratic-Republican Party took the formality of re-nominating Monroe for a second term, and the Federalists had ceased to exist at the national level.
Monroe then embarked on an extraordinary "Great Goodwill Tour" of the entire country in 1817 and 1819. He dressed in the then-fading 18th-century fashion, continuing to wear a powdered wig and donning a Revolutionary War-era uniform. When he visited New England, the stronghold of Federalism, he maintained his characteristic courtesy, dignity, and charm. Historians will record that this was an opportunity for the Federalists to disavow secession and reassert their loyalty to the American state, and they did so. Madison was warmly received as a legitimate president, not as a victorious enemy.
The Panic of 1819 was the first major financial crisis to hit America. It was quite serious, with mass unemployment affecting whole American cities for the first time. In Philadelphia, for example, an estimated 75% of the population was out of work. The expansionary monetary policy of the wartime government was likely to blame, and Monroe was influenced by the financial theory of the time, which viewed such panics as inevitable. He refused to make any substantive steps to combat the crisis, like modifying the tariff, restricting credit, expanding the money supply, or public works. Monroe was convinced that the federal government could not fix the problem by activism. To his merit, the crisis worked itself out completely by 1823, and the hands-off approach was vindicated in its era. Unfortunately, it was never applied consistently ever again. As further panics and depressions eventually came in 1837, 1873, 1893, and finally 1929, the government took increasingly radical steps to contain the problem, and yet each depression was worse than the one which preceded it. The Great Depression of the 1930s was by far the longest and yet by far the most laboriously-counterattacked by the federal government. As of this writing, the bailout and money supply wizardry tactics of the federal government are still ongoing and the recession of this era has probably still not hit bottom. You may read the above few sentences as my own personal bias, but for me Monroe gets the nod as the most ideologically pure handler of a financial crisis in US history.
The only noteworthy controversy during the Monroe presidency was the expansion of slavery. For the first time, there existed some semblance of anti-slavery politicking in the North, and it opposed the admission of any new states from the Louisiana Purchase as slave states. The slaveholding states in Congress opposed any restriction on slavery's expansion. Contrarily, it must be said, in 1820 as compared to 1850 or 1860, there was much less fierce defense of slavery in the South, and there was much less sympathy for slaves and abolitionism in North. Compromise was possible.
The Missouri Compromise passed the buck onward by admitting Missouri as a slave state while admitting Maine as a free state, keeping the balance. Looking toward the future, it seemed to satisfy both parties by dividing the western territories of the United States into free state territory north of the parallel, and slave territory south of it. Happily for Monroe, this agreement took place before the 1820 election, and with no substantive problem that could be levied against his administration, he ran unopposed and received a near-unanimous re-election.
Monroe was not an activist president who left his mark on the office. He was a peacemaker and a consensus-builder. He did not see himself as a leader of the Democratic-Republican Party, but of the entire nation. Consequently, he staffed his administration with everyone who was ambitious and capable, many of whom were the leading antebellum politicians: John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson, William Crawford, and John C. Calhoun. The first three would later squabble for the presidency immediately after Monroe left office, and Calhoun would later come to be a dominant pro-slavery figure in the Senate, rivaling Henry Clay (who also ran for president in 1824) and Daniel Webster (who opposed slavery). In no case was national political unity maintained after 1824. However, Monroe did leave behind a reasonably strong economy, an extraordinary dignity to the Presidency, and a framework for effective regional compromise that would last for decades.
Monroe Doctrine- Everlasting triumph of British foreign policy
The Era of Good Feelings was still present in 1823, by which time almost every French, Spanish and Portuguese colony in South and Central America successfully declared independence and formed republics. They were able to do so with little bloodshed because all European nations were busy with the Napoleonic Wars in Europe.
The new states were all recognized by the USA, which welcomed the presence of an entire hemisphere dedicated to democracy. The Americans feared the return of former colonial overlords to reclaim the now-independent states of the Western Hemisphere. Another difficult question was on the Pacific Coast of North America, where Russia was expanding its claims and America was eager to rein in their ambitions. However, any kind of pledge by the United States to protect the sovereignty of the Americas was not backed by sufficient force.
There was now another option, unthinkable just ten years earlier: cooperation with the British. Following the successful conclusion of the War of 1812, the long-term repercussion of the now-thawed state of British-American relations was cooperation on the high seas. The British had not lost any territory in North America in the last war, and never had any in South America to begin with. They also considered it desirable to prevent the Spanish, French, and Portuguese from reconquering the profitable land in the Western Hemisphere, because that would have the consequence of disallowing British merchants to trade freely with those lands. Free trade benefited the British most of all nations, because of their massive merchant fleet.
The history books rarely make mention of the fact that the "Monroe Doctrine" was basically a British idea that was passed over to the Americans who convinced themselves that it was their own idea. The British Foreign Minister George Canning proposed to President Monroe that a joint declaration of the independence and territorial integrity of the New World be made by the United States and Great Britain. Canning must have known that Monroe couldn't possibly accept such terms so shortly after a war between the countries, particularly because this statement would have humiliated the United States by emphasizing its weakness.
On one side, an outright alliance with the British would have been silly and one-sided; a naval alliance was derided by Secretary of State Adams as "[...] undignified, like a tiny American cockboat sailing in the wake of a British man-of-war." Thus it was critical that the American people understood the plan to be purely American, and not implying anything about the power of the USA to enforce security of the Western Hemisphere. If any specific statements were made about America's commitment to defend other republics, it would have exposed the Americans as spineless and weak during a period that they lacked the strength to keep any European nation (even Russia or Portugal) out of the Americas.
On the other side, whatever statement the Americans made on behalf of the new nations of South America would be beneficial to its relations with those countries, and would let America save face in the eyes of the world, even if it didn't have plausible power to back it up. Americans must have also realized that if they made such a guarantee unilaterally, that it would meet with tacit British approval, and there would be irregular cooperation to enforce it between the navies, so the practical effect would be similar.
The end result was the Monroe Doctrine, actually devised by Adams, which was a very stuffy and boring legal-ese document. Simplified, it basically asserts that any attempts by colonial powers to conquer new lands or to challenge the territory or independence of existing republics, within the entire Western Hemisphere, would be opposed by the United States. Management and control of existing colonies was allowed (such as Canada). The Monroe Doctrine did not make any mention of Great Britain and it surely did not hint of alliance. It also gave no concrete commitments by the United States, and acted merely as an idealized theory for a then-unenforceable policy.
However, the British actually acted most strongly in defense of the Monroe Doctrine, so its practical effect was just the same as a bilateral agreement between the UK and US. The independence of the South American states was overwhelmingly protected by the Royal Navy, not by the fledgling US Navy.
Ironically, the vagueness of the Monroe Doctrine has allowed it to be used elastically throughout the ensuing years. In the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, Secretary of State Seward loudly threatened to send nearly 1 million war-tempered bayonets of the Union Army into Mexico to expel the French-appointed Emperor Maximilian; the French immediately disavowed their puppet and he was ingloriously executed by the Mexican people. By 1900, the USA was the world's strongest economic power, and although its military was relatively weak by European standards, it had the clout to add the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, emphasizing that any intervention in independent Latin American republics for the purpose of repaying debts would be opposed by the United States.
Still, however, none of these usurpations by the United States ever came at the expense of Great Britain, and the two nations became all the closer for it. The long-term effects of this cooperation are so ponderous that it is difficult to overstate them. If there had been no Monroe Doctrine, the interests of the US and UK may have diverged in a different direction, leading to war. It would never have been demonstrated how preferable it was to cooperate in the international scene. The fundamentally overlapping interests of these two nations was shown when both nations benefited by upholding the Monroe Doctrine. Without this crucial period, the United States may never have worked up enough sympathy to embroil itself in WWI on the British side, and perhaps naval war would have come in 1922 instead of the Washington Naval Conference.
Unquestionably, the long-term advantages of the Monroe Doctrine for the British were profound. The United States was weak in 1823, but it would be the world's most powerful nation just 80 years later. Cooperation with the Monroe Doctrine made Britain seem inherently more noble and trustworthy than other European monarchies, and not only made war between the two nations less probable, but also smoothed the transition of power. All previous world super-empires, such as Rome, Ming China, the Mongol Empire, and others had not faded gracefully, but disintegrated ingloriously. The British Empire did slowly fade away, but the United States financed the salvation of the homeland of the UK in two world wars and aided in its defense on a massive scale. To this day, the United Kingdom still enjoys cordial relations with most of its former colonies (including and especially the United States) and is still one of the world's most powerful and developed nations. Not too bad for them. I'd put the Monroe Doctrine at #1 on the list of the best British foreign policy decisions of all time. (We can only hope that the transition from the US to China, if it happens, is so mutualistic.)
Thursday, September 13, 2012
I just realized...
I just realized that I know why smaller classes are better. It has nothing to do with the quantity of time that the professor can offer outside of class to individual students. It has nothing to do with the style of grading, testing, or any of that. It doesn't matter that your professor isn't available for a quick email in the middle of the night, either, since (if you ask me) it's impossible to glean any valuable information from a quick email.
These are all worthy and positive outcomes of a smaller class size. But they're subsidiary to the depth of learning that it provides simply by student participation. Stunningly simple, but I'm unswerving in my conviction here.
The "best" way to learn is to teach others. That is not to say that you should immediately teach somebody by rote, such as by simply reading your textbook. I should qualify that the "best" way to begin learning is to read or listen. But learning is not complete without the ability to teach it. The way you teach others should be confident, eloquent descriptions of the fields you mean to understand. If you can't competently teach something, then you don't REALLY know it.
A smaller class is better because individual students can participate in the lecture. I suddenly realized this today when it hit me that Dr. Komogortsev's lecture style was paralyzed without participation, but thankfully the students were willing, and he was eager to aid the line of questioning into exactly what the students knew, and so allow their level of knowledge to take the lecture as far as it could go. I don't know if this is accidental or extremely brilliant, but for me it's utterly effective to be answering questions while learning. Albeit without the benefit of any graded materials yet, I think Komogortsev is an outstanding professor.
Of course this relies upon the students taking advantage of the opportunity of participation. There is nothing sorrier than a silent room after the professor asks an introductory question, or of a professor posing irrelevant, stupid questions that insult the intelligence of the students. But it's not a knock against this particular style. If you've got a bad prof, that's just the way it is. And if you don't read your text before class, it might be one of those classes you get an A in, but it won't be something near and dear to your heart. And I don't presume to tell anyone what to do with their lives, but if something is actually important enough to learn in the first place (particularly at the price of college today), shouldn't it be important enough to stay in your memory and understanding for years to come?
These are all worthy and positive outcomes of a smaller class size. But they're subsidiary to the depth of learning that it provides simply by student participation. Stunningly simple, but I'm unswerving in my conviction here.
The "best" way to learn is to teach others. That is not to say that you should immediately teach somebody by rote, such as by simply reading your textbook. I should qualify that the "best" way to begin learning is to read or listen. But learning is not complete without the ability to teach it. The way you teach others should be confident, eloquent descriptions of the fields you mean to understand. If you can't competently teach something, then you don't REALLY know it.
A smaller class is better because individual students can participate in the lecture. I suddenly realized this today when it hit me that Dr. Komogortsev's lecture style was paralyzed without participation, but thankfully the students were willing, and he was eager to aid the line of questioning into exactly what the students knew, and so allow their level of knowledge to take the lecture as far as it could go. I don't know if this is accidental or extremely brilliant, but for me it's utterly effective to be answering questions while learning. Albeit without the benefit of any graded materials yet, I think Komogortsev is an outstanding professor.
Of course this relies upon the students taking advantage of the opportunity of participation. There is nothing sorrier than a silent room after the professor asks an introductory question, or of a professor posing irrelevant, stupid questions that insult the intelligence of the students. But it's not a knock against this particular style. If you've got a bad prof, that's just the way it is. And if you don't read your text before class, it might be one of those classes you get an A in, but it won't be something near and dear to your heart. And I don't presume to tell anyone what to do with their lives, but if something is actually important enough to learn in the first place (particularly at the price of college today), shouldn't it be important enough to stay in your memory and understanding for years to come?
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